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Figure 1: Mean earnings and city size
1. Introduction
Workers in bigger cities earn more than workers in smaller cities and rural areas. Figure 1 plots
mean annual earnings for male employees against city size for Spanish urban areas. Workers
in Madrid earn  31,000 annually on average, which is 20% more than workers in Valencia (the
country’s third biggest city), 46% more than workers in Santiago de Compostela (the median-sized
city), and 52% more than workers in rural areas. The relationship between earnings and city size
is just as strong in other developed countries.1 Moreover, differences remain large even when
we compare workers with the same education and years of experience and in the same industry.
Higher costs of living may explain why workers do not ﬂock to bigger cities, but that does not
change the fact that ﬁrms must obtain some productive advantage to offset paying higher wages in
bigger cities.2 In fact, Combes, Duranton, Gobillon, and Roux (2010) ﬁnd that establishment-level
productivity and wages exhibit a similar elasticity with respect to city size.
There are three broad reasons why ﬁrms may be willing to pay more to workers in bigger
cities. First, there may be some static advantages associated with bigger cities that are enjoyed
while working there and lost upon moving away. These static agglomeration economies have
receivedthemostattention(seeDurantonandPuga,2004, forareviewofpossiblemechanismsand
1In the United States, workers in metropolitan areas with population above one million earn on average 30% more
than workers in rural areas (Glaeser, 2011). In France, workers in Paris earn on average 15% more than workers in
other large cities, such as Lyon or Marseille, 35% more than in mid-sized cities, and 60% more than rural areas (Combes,
Duranton, and Gobillon, 2008).
2Otherwise, ﬁrms in tradable sectors would relocate to smaller localities with lower wages. Of course, not all ﬁrms
are in tradable sectors, but as Moretti (2011) notes, “as long as there are some ﬁrms producing traded goods in every
city and workers can move between the tradable and non-tradable sector, average productivity has to be higher in cities
where nominal wages are higher.”
1Rosenthal and Strange, 2004, and Holmes, 2010, for summaries of the evidence). Second, workers
who are inherently more productive may choose to locate in bigger cities. Evidence on such sorting
is mixed, but some recent accounts (e.g., Combes, Duranton, and Gobillon, 2008) suggest it may
be as important in magnitude as static agglomeration economies. Third, a key advantage of cities
is that they facilitate experimentation and learning (Glaeser, 1999, Duranton and Puga, 2001). In
particular, bigger cities may provide workers with opportunities to accumulate more valuable
experience. Since these dynamic advantages are transformed in higher human capital, they may
remain beneﬁcial even when a worker relocates.
In this paper, we simultaneously consider these three potential sources of the city-size earnings
premium: static advantages, sorting based on initial ability and dynamic advantages. We begin in
section 2 with a methodological discussion of our approach and explain how it deals with biases
present in earlier estimates in the literature. Then, in section 3, we discuss the rich administrative
data set for Spain that we use. This follows workers over time and across locations throughout
their careers, thus allowing us to compare the earnings of workers in cities of different sizes, while
controlling for observed and unobserved ability and the experience previously acquired in various
other cities.
To facilitate a comparison with previous studies, we begin our empirical analysis in section 4
with a simple pooled ols estimation of the static advantages of bigger cities. For this, we estimate
a Mincerian regression of log wages on worker and job characteristics and city ﬁxed-effects. This
ﬁrst estimation ignores both the possible sorting of workers with higher unobserved ability into
bigger cities as well as any dynamic beneﬁts of bigger cities. As a result, it also produces a biased
estimate of the static advantages of bigger cities.
Following Glaeser and Maré (2001) and Combes, Duranton, and Gobillon (2008), we introduce
worker ﬁxed-effects to address the issue of workers sorting on unobservables. This leads to a
substantial reduction in the elasticity of the earnings premium with respect to city size, in line with
earlier studies. This drop is usually interpreted as evidence of more productive workers sorting
into bigger cities (Combes, Duranton, and Gobillon, 2008). We show that it is instead the result of
ignoring the dynamic beneﬁts that bigger cities provide.
In section 5 we explicitly examine the dynamic beneﬁts of bigger cities. Taking advantage of
being able to track the complete workplace location histories of a large panel of workers, we let the
value of experience vary depending on both where it was acquired and where it is being used. Our
results reveal that experience accumulated in bigger cities is more valuable, and remains so after
workers move elsewhere. We generalize this speciﬁcation further in section 6, where we explore
heterogeneity across workers in the learning advantages of bigger cities.3 Our estimates show that
the additional value of experience acquired in bigger cities is even greater for workers with higher
innate ability.
3The relevance of heterogeneity in the growth proﬁles of earnings has been underscored in the macroeconomics and
labor economics literature (see, e.g., Baker, 1997, Baker and Solon, 2003 and Guvenen, 2009). However, our focus is not
onthetimeseriespropertiesoftheearningsprocessnoronthevariancedecompositionbetweenpermanentortransitory
shocks, which have been extensively studied in the earnings dynamics literature (see Meghir and Pistaferri, 2011, for a
review). Instead, we highlight the spatial dimension of this heterogeneity in earnings proﬁles and its interaction with
individual ability.
2Finally, to get a better sense of whether there is sorting of workers with higher innate ability,
in section 7 we compare the distribution of ability across cities of different sizes. This exercise is
related to recent studies that also compare workers’ ability and skills across cities, either by looking
at levels of education (e.g., Berry and Glaeser, 2005), at broader measures of skills (e.g., Bacolod,
Blum, and Strange, 2009), or at estimated worker ﬁxed-effects (e.g., Combes, Duranton, Gobil-
lon, and Roux, 2012b). We focus on worker ﬁxed-effects because we are interested in capturing
time-invariant ability beyond observable characteristics. However, we show that it is essential to
estimate worker ﬁxed-effects using our full earnings speciﬁcation, because otherwise we end up
mixing innate ability with the extra value of big-city experience.
Once we isolate innate ability from the value of experience accumulated in bigger cities, we ﬁnd
sorting to be much less important than previously thought. Workers in big and small cities are not
particularly different to start with; it is working in cities of different sizes that makes their earnings
diverge. They attain a static earnings premium upon arrival in a bigger city and accumulate
more valuable experience as they spend more time working there. This ﬁnding is consistent with
the counterfactual simulations of the structural model in Baum-Snow and Pavan (2012a), which
suggest that returns to experience and wage-level effects are the most important mechanisms
contributing to the overall city-size earnings premium.4 Because these gains are stronger for
workers with higher unobserved initial ability, this combination of effects explains not only the
higher mean but also the greater dispersion of earnings in bigger cities that Eeckhout, Pinheiro,
and Schmidheiny (2010), Combes, Duranton, Gobillon, and Roux (2012b) and Baum-Snow and
Pavan (2012b) emphasize.
2. Methodology
Suppose the log wage of worker i in city c at time t, wict, is given by
wict = sc + mi +
C
å
j=1
djceijt + x0
itb + #ict , (1)
where sc is a city ﬁxed-effect, mi is a worker ﬁxed-effect, eijt is the experience acquired by worker i
in city j up until time t, xit is a vector of time-varying individual and job characteristics, the scalars
djc and the vector b are parameters, and #ict is an error term. 5
Equation (1) allows for a static earnings premium associated with currently working in a bigger
city, if the city ﬁxed-effect sc is positively correlated with city size. It also allows for the sorting
4Baum-Snow and Pavan (2012a) address unobserved ability by using a three-type mixture model where the proba-
bility of a worker being of certain type is non-parametrically identiﬁed and depends among other factors on the city
where he enters the labour market. Since we have a much larger sample (150,000 men observed monthly compared
with 1,700 men observed annually) we are able to estimate a worker ﬁxed-effect and to let the value of experience in
different cities vary systematically with this ﬁxed-effect. In this way, we can recover the distribution of ability in cities
of different sizes without making assumptions on the relationship between observables and unobservables.
5The city ﬁxed-effect sc could also be time-varying and written sct instead. We keep it time-invariant here for
simplicity. In our estimations, we have tried both having time-varying and time-invariant city ﬁxed-effects. We ﬁnd
that the elasticity of time-varying city ﬁxed-effects with respect to time-varying city size is the same as the elasticity
of time-invariant city ﬁxed-effects with respect to time-invariant city size. Thus, we stick with time-invariant city
ﬁxed-effects so as not to increase excessively the number of parameters in the richer speciﬁcations that we introduce
later in the paper.
3of more productive workers into bigger cities, if the worker ﬁxed-effect mi is positively correlated
with city size. Finally, we conjecture that one of the advantages of bigger cities is that they let
workers accumulate more valuable experience, so equation (1) allows experience accumulated in
city j to have a different value which may be positively correlated with city size. This value of
experience djc is indexed by both j (the city where experience was acquired) and c (the city where
the worker currently works) to allow for the value of experience to vary depending not only on
where it was acquired but also on where it is being used. In our estimations, we also include terms
in e2
ijt, which are relevant but left out of the equations in this section to simplify the exposition.
Static pooled estimation
Imagine that, instead of estimating equation (1), we ignore both unobserved worker heterogeneity
and any dynamic beneﬁts of working in bigger cities, and estimate the following relationship:
wict = sc + x0
itb + hict . (2)
Compared with equation (1), in equation (2) the worker ﬁxed-effect mi and the urban experience
terms å
C
j=1djceijt are missing. Equation (2) can be estimated by ordinary least squares with a cross
section of workers or a pooled panel.
Assuming for simplicity that Cov(xit,mi + å
C
j=1djceijt) = 0, the resulting pooled ols estimate of
sc would be unbiased if and only if
Cov(iict,hict) = 0 , (3)
where iict is a city indicator variable that takes value 1 if worker i is in city c at time t and value
0 otherwise. However, if the richer wage determination of equation (1) holds, the error term of
equation (2) includes the omitted variables:
hict = mi +
C
å
j=1
djceijt + #ict . (4)
Hence,
Cov(iict,hict) = Cov(iict,mi) + Cov(iict,
C
å
j=1
djceijt) 6= 0 . (5)
Equation (5) shows that a static cross-section or pooled ols estimation of sc suffers from two key
potential sources of bias. First, it ignores sorting, and thus the earnings premium for city c, sc, is
biased upwards if individuals with high unobserved ability, mi, are more likely to work there, so
that Cov(iict,mi) > 0 (and biased downwards in the opposite case). Second, it ignores dynamic
effects, and thus the earnings premium for city c, sc, is biased upwards if individuals with more
valuable experience, å
C
j=1 djceijt, are more likely to work there, so that Cov(iict,å
C
j=1djceijt) > 0 (and
biased downwards in the opposite case).6
6Strictly speaking, the actual bias in the pooled ols estimate of sc, ˆ sc pooled, is more complicated because it is not
necessarily the case that Cov(xit,mi + å
C
j=1djceijt) = 0, as we have assumed. For instance, even if we do not allow the
value of experience to vary by city, we may have overall experience, eit  å
C
j=1 eijt, as one of the explanatory variables
included in xit in equation (2). In this case, djc measures the differential value of the experience acquired in city j
when working in city c relative to the general value of experience, which we may denote g. Then plim ˆ sc pooled =
sc +Cov(iict,mi)/Var(iict)+å
C
j=1djcCov(iict,eijt)/Var(iict)+(g  ˆ gpooled)Cov(iict,eit)/Var(iict). Relative to the simpler
example discussed in the main text, the bias incorporates an additional term (g   ˆ gpooled)Cov(iict,eit)/Var(iict). In
practice, this additional term is negligible if Cov(iict,eit) is close to zero, that is, if the total number of days of work
experience (leaving aside where it was acquired) is not systematically related to workers’ location. In our sample, this
is indeed the case: the correlation between mean experience and log city size is not signiﬁcantly different from 0.
4To see how these biases work more clearly, it is useful to consider a simple example. Suppose
there are just two cities, one big and one small. Everyone working in the big city enjoys an
instantaneous (static) log wage premium of s. Workers in the big city have higher unobserved
ability, which increases their log wage by m. Otherwise, all workers are initially identical. Over
time, experience accumulated in the big city increases log wage by d per period relative to having
worked in the small city instead. For now, assume there is no migration. If there are n time
periods, then the pooled ols estimate of the static big city premium s has probability limit
plim ˆ spooled = s + m + n+1
2 d. Thus, a pooled ols regression overestimates the actual premium
by the value of higher unobserved worker ability in the big city (m) and the higher average value
of accumulated experience in the big city (n+1
2 d).
Static ﬁxed-effects estimation
Following Glaeser and Maré (2001) and, more recently, Combes, Duranton, and Gobillon (2008), a
possible approach to address the issue of workers sorting on unobservables is to introduce worker
ﬁxed-effects. Suppose deal with unobserved worker heterogeneity in this way, but still ignore a
dynamic city-size premium and estimate the following relationship:
wict = sc + mi + x0
itb + zict . (6)
Compared with equation (1), the city-speciﬁc experience terms å
C
j=1djceijt are missing from equa-
tion (6). Compared with equation (2), the worker ﬁxed-effect mi is included. To estimate sc we now
need a panel. The worker ﬁxed-effect mi can be eliminated by subtracting from equation (6) the
time average for each worker:
(wict   ¯ wi) =
C
å
j=1
sc(iict   ¯ iic) + (x0
it   ¯ x0
i)b + (zict   ¯ zi) . (7)
Notethat sc isnowestimatedonlyonthebasisofmigrants—forworkerswhoarealwaysobserved
in the same city iict = ¯ iic = 1 every period.7
Assuming again for simplicity that Cov(xit,å
C
j=1djceijt) = 0, the resulting ﬁxed-effects estimate
of sc is unbiased if
Cov
 
(iict   ¯ iic),(zict   ¯ zi)

= 0 . (8)
However, if the richer wage determination of equation (1) holds,
(zict   ¯ zi) =
C
å
j=1
djc(eijt   ¯ eij) + (#ict   ¯ #i) , (9)
7This can be a source of concern for the estimation of city ﬁxed-effects if migrants are not representative of the
broader worker population or if the decision to migrate to a particular city depends on shocks speciﬁc to a worker-
city pair. As long as workers choose their location based on their characteristics (both observable and time-invariant
unobservable), on job traits such as the sector and occupation, and on characteristics of the city, the estimation of sc will
remain unbiased. However, any unobserved time-varying factor that is correlated with the error term in equation (6) —
such as a particularly attractive wage offer in another city — will bias the estimation of city ﬁxed-effects. See Combes,
Duranton, and Gobillon (2008) for a detailed discussion. Nevertheless, even if people were to migrate only when they
got a particularly high wage offer, provided that this affects similarly moves to bigger cities and moves to smaller cities,
and that migration ﬂows across cities of different sizes are approximately balanced (as they are in our data), then the
actual bias may be small. Also, if the migration decision is based mainly on the expectations of earnings in the medium
term and not on transitory shocks, this concern is alleviated.
5and thus
Cov
 
(iict   ¯ iic),(zict   ¯ zi)

= Cov
 
(iict   ¯ iic),
C
å
j=1
djc(eijt   ¯ eij)

6= 0 . (10)
Worker ﬁxed-effects take care of unobserved worker heterogeneity. However, the estimate of sc is
stillbiasedbecausedynamiceffectsareignored. Theearningspremiumforcity c isbiasedupwards
if the value of workers’ experience tends to be above their individual averages in the periods when
they are located in city c. It is biased downwards when the reverse is true.
Again, to see how this bias works more clearly, it is instructive to use the same simple two-city
example as for the pooled ols estimate. Like before, everyone working in the big city enjoys an
instantaneous (static) log wage premium of s. Workers in the big city have higher unobserved
ability, which increases their log wage by m. Otherwise, all workers are initially identical. Over
time, experience accumulated in the big city increases log wage by d per period relative to having
worked in the small city instead. Since with worker ﬁxed-effects sc is estimated only on the basis
of migrants, we add migration to the example. Consider two cases.
First, suppose all migration is from the small to the big city and takes place after migrants have
worked in the small city for the ﬁrst m periods of the total of n periods. The ﬁxed-effects estimate
of the static big city premium s is now estimated by comparing the earnings of migrants before
and after moving and has probability limit plim ˆ sfe = s+ n m+1
2 d. With all migrants moving from
the small to the big city, the ﬁxed-effects regression overestimates the actual static premium (s)
by the average extra value of the experience migrants accumulate by working in the big city after
moving (n m+1
2 d). The estimation of equation (6) forces the earnings premium to be a pure jump
at the time of moving, while in the example it actually has both static and dynamic components.
Not trying to separately measure the dynamic component not only ignores it, but also makes the
static part seem larger than it is.
Consider next the case where all migration is from the big to the small city and takes place after
migrants have worked in the big city for the ﬁrst m periods of the total of n periods. Now, we also
need to know whether the extra value of experience accumulated in the big city is fully portable
or only partially so. Assume only a fraction q is portable. The ﬁxed-effects estimate of the static
big city premium s then has probability limit plim ˆ sfe = s   m 1
2 qd. With all migrants moving
from the big to the small city, the ﬁxed-effects regression underestimates the actual static premium
(s) by the average extra (but depreciated) value of the experience migrants acquired in the big
city prior to moving (m 1
2 qd). By forcing both the static and dynamic premium to be captured
by a discrete jump, the jump now appears to be smaller than it is. The dynamic part is still not
separately measured.
Thisexampleshowsthattheestimationwithworkerﬁxed-effectsdealswiththepossiblesorting
of workers across cities on time-invariant unobservable characteristics. However, the estimates of
city ﬁxed-effects are still biased due to not considering dynamic beneﬁts. This, in turn, biases
any estimate of the earnings premium associated with bigger cities. Migrants from small to big
cities tend to bias the static city-size premium upwards (their average wage difference across cities
is ‘too high’ because when in big cities they beneﬁt from the more valuable experience they are
accumulating there). Migrants from big to small cities tend to bias the static city-size premium
downwards (their average wage difference across cities is ‘too low’ because when in small cities
6they still beneﬁt from the more valuable experience accumulated in big cities). In practice, the bias
is likely to be small if the sample is more or less balanced in terms of migration ﬂows across cities
of different sizes, and the learning beneﬁts of bigger cities are highly portable (in the example,
if q is close to 1). The ﬁrst condition, that migration is balanced, is likely to be true given that
gross migration ﬂows are generally large relative to net ﬂows.8 The second condition, that the
learning beneﬁts of bigger cities are highly portable, is one that we cannot assess without actually
estimating the fully-ﬂedged speciﬁcation of equation (1).
Thestaticearningspremiumassociatedwithworkinginbiggercitieshasbeenfoundtobeabout
twice as large when estimated using either pooled or aggregate data, such as that of equation (2),
than when estimated using a speciﬁcation with worker ﬁxed-effects, such as that of equation (6).
This is shown by Combes, Duranton, and Gobillon (2008), who interpret the difference as evidence
of the importance of sorting by more productive workers into bigger cities.
In this section, we have shown that, if learning effects such as those included in equation (1)
are important, then the estimation of equation (6) affects not just one, but two sources of bias
present in the estimation of equation (2). By including worker ﬁxed-effects, equation (6) addresses
the bias arising from workers’ possibly sorting on the basis of unobserved idiosyncratic ability;
however, it also affects the magnitude of the bias in the estimated static city-size premium arising
from ignoring the dynamic component of the premium. It will not formally eliminate it but, under
certain conditions, it can greatly reduce it. The lower static earnings premium found when using
worker ﬁxed-effects could thus reﬂect either the importance of sorting by workers across cities in a
way that is systematically related to unobserved ability, or the importance of learning by working
in bigger cities, or a combination of both. We cannot know unless we simultaneously consider
the static and the dynamic components of the earnings premium while allowing for unobserved
worker heterogeneity. This requires estimating a speciﬁcation such as equation (1), where the
worker ﬁxed-effect mi can be again eliminated by subtracting the time average for each worker:9
(wict   ¯ wi) =
C
å
j=1
sc(iict   ¯ iic) +
C
å
j=1
djc(eijt   ¯ eij) + (x0
it   ¯ x0
i)b + (#ict   ¯ #i) . (11)
However, the main reason to estimate a speciﬁcation that allows workers to accumulate more
valuable experience in bigger cities is not to verify how accurate are current estimates of the static
advantages of bigger cities. The main reason is to also estimate the magnitude of their dynamic
advantages, which we believe may be quite important. Thus, after estimating the restricted speci-
ﬁcations of equations (2) and (6) for comparison with earlier studies, we estimate an expression
like equation (1). This allows us to separately estimate the static advantages associated with
workers’ current location, and the dynamic advantages arising from the more valuable experience
individuals acquire by working in bigger cities. We are also able to investigate the extent to which
8In the sample of 150,375 workers that we use in this paper, between 2004 and 2009 there are 8,356 migrations from
the ﬁve biggest cities to smaller cities in Spain, 8,362 migrations from smaller cities to the ﬁve biggest cities, and another
20,725 moves between cities of similar sizes.
9Note that the city ﬁxed-effects, sc, are still estimated on the basis of migrants as in equation (7), since for workers
who are always observed in the same city iict = ¯ iic = 1 every period. However, the value of experience in different
cities, djc, is estimated on the basis of both migrants and stayers, since eijt varies over time for both. This somewhat
alleviates the usual concern of relying on migrants to estimate the earnings premium of bigger cities: while the static
earnings premium is still derived from migrants, all workers contribute to the estimation of dynamic effects.
7the learning beneﬁts of bigger cities are portable when workers relocate. Finally, we can also
re-examine the importance of sorting based on initial unobserved ability.
3. Data
Employment histories and earnings
Our main data set is Spain’s Continuous Sample of Employment Histories (Muestra Continua de
Vidas Laborales or mcvl). This is an administrative data set with longitudinal information obtained
by matching social security, income tax, and census records for a 4% non-stratiﬁed random sample
of the population who on a given year have any relationship with Spain’s Social Security (indi-
viduals who are working, receiving unemployment beneﬁts, or receiving a pension). The criterion
for inclusion in the mcvl (based on the individual’s Social Security number) is maintained across
mcvl waves.10 We combine ﬁve editions of the mcvl, beginning with the ﬁrst produced, for 2004,
so as to have data on a random sample of approximately 4% of all individuals who have worked,
received beneﬁts or a pension in Spain at any point in 2004–2009.
A crucial feature of the mcvl for our purposes is that workers can be tracked across space
based on their workplace location. Social Security legislation requires employers to keep separate
contribution account codes for each province in which they conduct business. Furthermore, within
a province, a municipality identiﬁcation code is provided if the workplace establishment is located
in a municipality with population greater than 40,000 inhabitants in 2001.
The unit of observation in the source social security data is any change in the individual’s
labour market status or any variation in job characteristics (including changes in occupation or
contractual conditions within the same ﬁrm). The data record all changes since the date of ﬁrst
employment, or since 1981 for earlier entrants. Using this information, we construct a panel with
monthly observations tracking the working life of individuals in the sample. On each date, we
know the individuals’s labour market status and, if working, the occupation and type of contract,
working hours expressed as a percentage of a full-time equivalent job, the establishment’s sector of
activity at the nace 3-digit level, and the establishment’s location. Furthermore, by exploiting the
panel dimension, we can construct precise measures of tenure and experience, calculated as the
actual number of days the individual has been employed, respectively, in the same establishment
and overall. We can also track cumulative experience in different locations or sets of locations.
Earnings are derived from income tax data for the year of each mcvl edition, where each source
oflabourincomerecordedinincometaxrecordsismatchedtosocialsecurityrecordsbasedonboth
employee and employer (anonymized) identiﬁers. Gross labour earnings and tax withholdings are
recorded separately for each job. This allows us to compute monthly labour earnings, expressed
10More recent editions add individuals who enter the labour force for the ﬁrst time while they lose those who
cease afﬁliation with the Social Security. Since individuals who stop working remain in the sample while they receive
unemployment beneﬁts or a retirement pension, most exits occur when individuals are deceased or leave the country
permanently.
8as euros per day of full-time equivalent work, during the period 2004–2009.11
The mcvl also provides individual characteristics contained in social security records, such as
age and gender, and also characteristics contained in Spain’s Continuous Census of Population
(Padrón Continuo), such as country of birth, nationality, and educational attainment.12
Urban areas
We use ofﬁcial urban area deﬁnitions, constructed by Spain’s Department of Housing in 2008 and
maintained unchanged since then. The 85 urban areas account for 68% of Spain’s population and
10% of its surface. Four urban areas (Madrid, Barcelona, Valencia and Sevilla) have populations
above one million, Madrid being the largest with 5,966,067 inhabitants in 2009. At the other end,
Teruel is the smallest with 35,396 inhabitants in 2009. Urban areas contain 747 municipalities
out of the over 8,000 that exhaustively cover Spain. There is large variation in the number of
municipalities per urban area. The urban area of Barcelona is made up of 165 municipalities while
21 urban areas contain a single municipality.
Six urban areas (Denia - Jávea, Valle de la Orotava, Blanes - Lloret de Mar, Sant Feliú de Guixols,
Soria, and Teruel) have no municipality with a population of at least 40,000 in 2001, and are not
included in the analysis since they cannot be identiﬁed in the mcvl. We must also exclude the four
urban areas in the Basque Country and Navarre (Bilbao, San Sebastián, Vitoria and Pamplona)
because we lack earnings from tax returns data since the Basque Country and Navarre collect taxes
independently. Last, we exclude Ceuta and Melilla given their special enclave status in continental
Africa. This leaves 73 urban areas for which we carry out our analysis.
To measure the scale of each urban area, we calculate the number of people within 10 kilometres
of the average person. We do so starting with population counts at the level of individual mu-
nicipalities from Spain’s Continuous Census of Population (Padrón Continuo). We then allocate
population within the municipality more ﬁnely on the basis of LandScan (Oak Ridge National
Laboratory, 2009), a global population data set developed for the United States Department of
Defense with a resolution of approximately 1 square kilometre (3030 arc-seconds) showing spa-
tial distribution patterns of ambient population (average over 24 hours). Finally, we take each
3030 arc-seconds cell in the urban area, trace a circle of radius 10 kilometres around the cell
(encompassing both areas inside and outside the urban area), count population in that circle, and
average this count over all cells in the urban area weighting by the population in each cell. This
yields the number of people within 10 kilometres of the average person in the urban area.
Our measure of city size is highly correlated with a simple population count (0.94), but deals
more naturally with unusual urban areas, in particular those that are polycentric. Most urban
areas in Spain comprise a single densely populated urban centre and contiguous areas that are
11The mcvl also contains earnings data from social security records going back to 1981 but, unlike the uncensored
income tax data that we use to compute monthly earnings, these are either top or bottom coded for about 12% of
observations.
12A complete national update of the educational attainment of individuals recorded in the Continuous Census of
Population was performed in 1996, with a subsequent update by most municipalities in 2001. Beyond that year, any
updates happen when individuals complete their registration questionnaire at a new municipality upon moving (a
pre-requisiteforaccesstolocalhealthandeducationservices)orvoluntarilycommunicatetotheirmunicipalityachange
in their highest level of education.
9closely bound to the centre by commuting and employment patterns. However, a handful of urban
areas are made up of multiple urban centres. A simple population count for these polycentric
urban areas tends to exaggerate their scale, because to maintain contiguity they incorporate large
intermediate areas that are often only weakly connected to the various centres. For instance, the
urban area of Asturias incorporates the cities of Gijón, Oviedo, Avilés, Mieres, and Langreo as well
as large areas in between. A simple population count would rank the urban area of Asturias sixth
in terms of its 2009 population (835,231), just ahead of Zaragoza (741,132). Our measure of scale
ranks Asturias nineteenth in terms of people within 10 kilometres of the average person (242,099)
and Zaragoza ﬁfth (585,921), which is arguably a more accurate characterization of their relative
scale.
Sample restrictions
Our starting sample is a monthly data set for men born in Spain between 1963 and 1991 (i.e.,
aged 18–46 during the period 1981–2009) and employed at any point between January 2004 and
December 2009. We focus on men due to the huge changes experienced by Spain’s female labour
force during the period over which we track labour market experiences. Most notably, the partic-
ipation rate for prime-age women (25–54) increased from 30% in 1981 to 77% in 2009. We leave
out foreign-born workers and those born before 1963 because we cannot track their full labour
histories. We exclude spells workers spend as self-employed because labour earnings are not
available during such periods, but still include job spells as employees for the same individuals.
This initial sample has 249,227 workers and 11,803,962 monthly observations.
We track workers over time throughout their working life, but study them only when employed
in an urban area in 2004–2009. Job spells in the Basque Country and Navarre are excluded because
these autonomous regions collect income taxes independently from Spain’s national government
and we do not have earnings data from income tax records for them. We also exclude job spells
in six small urban areas because workplace location is not available for municipalities with pop-
ulation below 40,000 in 2001. Nevertheless, the days worked in urban areas within the Basque
Country or Navarre, in the six small excluded urban areas, or in rural areas anywhere in the
country are still counted when computing cumulative experience (both overall experience and
experience by location). These restrictions reduce the sample to 183,447 workers and 7,154,764
monthly observations.
Job spells in agriculture, ﬁshing, mining and other extractive industries are excluded because
these activities are typically rural and are covered by special social security regimes where workers
tend to self-report earnings and the number of working days recorded is not reliable. Job spells in
the public sector, international organizations, and in education and health services are also left out
because earnings in these sectors are heavily regulated by the national and regional governments.
Apprenticeship contracts and certain rare contract types are also excluded. Finally, we drop
workers who have not worked at least 30 days in any year. This yields our ﬁnal sample of 150,375
workers and 5,821,846 monthly observations.
104. Static beneﬁts of bigger cities
We begin by pooling the data and estimating the static city-size earnings premium without tak-
ing into account neither learning effects nor unobserved worker heterogeneity. We do this in a
two-stage process. In the ﬁrst stage we estimate equation (2), regressing log daily earnings on a
complete set of city indicators, while controlling for individual and job characteristics. Then, in a
second stage, we regress the coefﬁcients of the city indicators on our measure of log size to estimate
the elasticity of the earnings premium with respect to city size.
The results for this two-stage estimation are in columns (1) and (2) in table 1. As we would
expect, column (1) shows that log earnings are concave in overall experience and tenure in the ﬁrm
and increase monotonically with occupational skills.13 Having tertiary education and working
under a full-time and permanent contract are also associated with higher earnings.
In column (2) the estimate of the elasticity of the earnings premium with respect to city size is
0.048. More detail on the numbers behind this estimate can be seen in ﬁgure 2, which plots the
city indicators estimated in column (1) against log city size. We ﬁnd sizable geographic differences
in earnings even for observationally-equivalent workers. For instance, a worker in Madrid earns
21% more than a worker with the same observable characteristics in Lorca — the smallest city in
our sample. The largest earning differential of 36% is found between workers in Barcelona and
Lugo. City size is a powerful predictor of differences in earnings as it can explain a quarter of the
variation that is left after controlling for observable worker characteristics (R2 of 0.256 in column
2). This pooled ols estimate of the elasticity of the earnings premium with respect to city size
reﬂects that doubling city size is associated with an approximate increase of 5% in earnings.
We have carried out alternative estimations for this pooled ols two-stage estimation. First, we
have included interactions of city and year indicators in the ﬁrst-stage to address the possibility
of such city effects being time-variant. Then, in the second stage we regress all estimated city-
year indicators on time-varying log city size and year indicators. The estimated elasticity remains
unalteredat0.048. Second, wehavealsoestimatedtheelasticityinaone-stageprocessbyincluding
log city size directly in the Mincerian speciﬁcation of log earnings. In this case, the estimated
elasticity rises slightly to 0.053.14
Following our discussion in section 2, the pooled ols estimate of the elasticity of interest con-
ceals two potential biases: unobserved worker heterogeneity and the omission of more valuable
experience accumulated in bigger cities. In column (3) of table 1 we estimate equation (6) by
13Employers assign workers into one of ten social security occupation categories which we have regrouped into seven
skill categories. For instance, top managers are assigned to social security category 1 equivalent to our ’very-high-skilled
occupation’ category.
14Urban economists have studied agglomeration beneﬁts arising from local specialization in speciﬁc sectors in addi-
tion to those related to the overall scale of economic activity in a city. Following Combes, Duranton, Gobillon, and Roux
(2010), we can account for these potential beneﬁts of specialization by including the share of the sector in which the
worker is employed in total employment in the city as an additional explanatory variable in the ﬁrst-stage regression.
When we do this, the elasticity of the earnings premium with respect to city size is almost unchanged, rising only
marginally to 0.050. This result indicates that some small but highly specialized cities do pay relatively high wages in
the sectors in which they specialize, but that this leads only to a small reduction in the earnings gap between big and
small cities).
11Table 1: Estimation of the static city-size earnings premium
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Log City indicator Log City indicator
Dependent variable: earnings coefﬁcients earnings coefﬁcients
column (1) column (3)
Log city size 0.048 0.025
(0.008) (0.006)
City indicators Yes Yes
Worker ﬁxed-effects No Yes
Experience 0.033 0.107
(0.001) (0.002)
Experience2 -0.001 -0.001
(0.000) (0.000)
Firm tenure 0.014 0.003
(0.001) (0.000)
Firm tenure2 -0.001 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
Secondary education 0.100
(0.002)
University education 0.185
(0.004)
Very-high-skilled occupation 0.790 0.256
(0.006) (0.006)
High-skilled occupation 0.520 0.195
(0.005) (0.004)
Medium-high-skilled occupation 0.375 0.127
(0.006) (0.005)
Medium-skilled occupation 0.227 0.093
(0.004) (0.003)
Medium-low-skilled occupation 0.120 0.059
(0.005) (0.005)
Low-skilled occupation 0.064 0.021
(0.002) (0.002)
Observations 5,821,846 73 5,821,846 73
R2 0.489 0.256 0.118 0.164
Notes: All speciﬁcations include a constant term. Columns (1) and (3) include month-year indicators, two-digit sector
indicators, and contract-type indicators. Coefﬁcients are reported with robust standard errors in parenthesis, which
are clustered by worker in columns (1) and (3). , , and  indicate signiﬁcance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels.
The R2 reported in column (3) is within workers. Worker values of experience and tenure are calculated on the basis
of actual days worked and expressed in years.
introducing worker ﬁxed-effects in the ﬁrst stage of the estimation. This strategy takes care of
the ﬁrst concern i.e., more productive workers (or those with higher unobserved time-invariant
ability) sorting into bigger cities. The difference with the Mincerian speciﬁcation of log earnings in
column (1) is that now we estimate city indicators on the basis of migrants. All other coefﬁcients
are estimated by exploiting time variation and job changes within workers’ lives. In column (4) the
estimated elasticity of the earnings premium with respect to city size drops substantially to 0.025.15
The pooled ols estimate of the elasticity of interest, 0.048, is in line with previous estimates that
use worker-level data with similar sample restrictions. Combes, Duranton, Gobillon, and Roux
15The alternative estimations discussed above result in similar magnitudes of this elasticity ranging between 0.025
and 0.027.
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Figure 2: Static ols estimation of the city-size premium
(2010) ﬁnd an elasticity of 0.051 for France while Glaeser and Resseger (2010) obtain an elasticity
of 0.041 for the United States.16 When worker ﬁxed-effects are introduced Combes, Duranton,
Gobillon, andRoux(2010)seeadeclineintheelasticityof35%to0.033, whileMionandNaticchioni
(2009) report a larger drop of 66% for Italy. Our estimated drop of 46% lies in between both.
5. Dynamic beneﬁts of bigger cities
We now turn to a joint estimation of the static and dynamic advantages of bigger cities while
allowing for unobserved worker heterogeneity. This involves our full earnings speciﬁcation of
equation (1). For this, we need to keep track of the experience a worker has accumulated in one
city or group of cities of similar size. In column (1) of table 2 we add to the ﬁrst-stage speciﬁcation
the experience (calculated in days and then expressed in years) accumulated in the two biggest
cities — Madrid and Barcelona — and the square of this to allow for concavity in the effect. We
also add experience accumulated in the next three biggest cities — Valencia, Sevilla and Zaragoza
— and the square of this. We still take care of unobserved time-invariant worker heterogeneity by
using worker ﬁxed-effects, just as in column (3) of table 1.
Our results indicate that experience accumulated in bigger cities is more valuable than over-
all experience accumulated elsewhere. For instance, the ﬁrst year of experience in Madrid or
16Combes, Duranton, Gobillon, and Roux (2010) aggregate individual data into a city-sector level data to estimate an
elasticity analogous to our pooled ols result. Mion and Naticchioni (2009) ﬁnd the lowest estimate of this elasticity for
Italy (0.022).
13Table 2: Estimation of the dynamic and static city-size earnings premia
(1) (2) (3)
Log Initial Medium-term
Dependent variable: earnings premium premium
(city indicator (initial +
coefﬁcients 7 years local
column (1)) experience)
Log city size 0.025 0.049
(0.006) (0.011)
City indicators Yes
Worker ﬁxed-effects Yes
Experience 1st-2nd biggest cities 0.027
(0.001)
(Experience 1st-2nd biggest cities)2 -0.001
(0.000)
Experience 1st-2nd biggest cities  now in smaller 0.002
(0.001)
Experience 3rd-5th biggest cities 0.011
(0.001)
(Experience 3rd-5th biggest cities)2 -0.000
(0.000)
Experience 3rd-5th biggest cities  now in bigger 0.001
(0.003)
Experience 3rd-5th biggest cities  now in smaller -0.002
(0.002)
Experience 0.094
(0.002)
Experience2 -0.001
(0.000)
Firm tenure 0.002
(0.000)
Firm tenure2 -0.000
(0.000)
Very high skilled occupation 0.251
(0.006)
High skilled occupation 0.193
(0.004)
Medium-high skilled occupation 0.128
(0.005)
Medium skilled occupation 0.094
(0.003)
Medium-low skilled occupation 0.060
(0.005)
Low skilled occupation 0.022
(0.002)
Observations 5,821,846 73 73
R2 0.120 0.165 0.366
Notes: All regressions include a constant term. Column (1) includes month-year indicators, two-digit sector indicators,
and contract-type indicators. Coefﬁcients are reported with robust standard errors in parenthesis, which are clustered
by worker in column (1). , , and  indicate signiﬁcance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels. The R2 reported in column
(1) is within workers. Worker values of experience and tenure are calculated on the basis of actual days worked and
expressed in years. City medium-term premium calculated for workers’ average experience in one city (7.24 years).
14Barcelona raises earnings by 2.7% relative to having worked that same year in a city below the
top-ﬁve. The ﬁrst year of experience in a city ranked 3rd to 5th raises earnings by 1.1% relative to
having worked that same year in a city below the top-ﬁve. We have also tried ﬁner groupings of
cities by size (not reported), but found no signiﬁcant differences in the value of experience within
the reported groupings (e.g., between Madrid and Barcelona).
In our earnings speciﬁcation we also allow for the value of experience accumulated in bigger
cities to vary depending on where it is used. For this purpose, we include an interaction of years
of experience accumulated in the top-two cities and an indicator for being currently working in a
smaller city. Similarly, we include interactions of years of experience accumulated in cities ranked
3rd to 5th and indicators for currently working in either bigger or smaller cities. We ﬁnd all these
interactions to be either non-signiﬁcant or of small quantitative importance which suggests that
the experience acquired in bigger cities is highly portable.17 Glaeser and Resseger (2010) show
that workers who reside in us metropolitan areas get a larger wage increase from the same level
of potential overall experience than workers in rural areas. However, they ﬁnd that the effect does
not vary across metropolitan areas of different sizes. Our results help understand why this is the
case: what matters across metropolitan areas is where experience is acquired and not where it is
used. Experience accumulated in bigger cities is more valuable and remains so even when workers
relocate to smaller cities.
Earnings proﬁles
Anillustrativewaytopresentourresultsistoplottheevolutionofearningsforworkersindifferent
cities, calculated on the basis of the coefﬁcients estimated in column (1) of table 2. In panel (a) of
ﬁgure 3, the higher solid line depicts the earnings proﬁle over ten years of an individual working in
Madrid during this entire period relative to the earnings of a worker with identical characteristics
(both observable and time-invariant unobservable) who instead works in Santiago de Compostela
(the median-sized city in our sample). To be clear, the top solid line does not represent how fast
earnings rise in absolute terms while working in Madrid, they represent how much faster they rise
when working in Madrid than when working in Santiago. For the worker in Madrid, the proﬁle
of relative earnings has an intercept and a slope component. First, we calculate the intercept as
the difference in estimated city ﬁxed-effects between Madrid and Santiago. Next, we compute the
slope by evaluating the differential value of experience accumulated in Madrid and its square at
different years. Initially, a worker in Madrid earns 10% more than a worker in Santiago, but this
gap widens considerably, so that after ten years the difference in earnings reaches 34%. The lower
solid line depicts the earnings proﬁle over ten years of an individual working in Sevilla relative
17It is worth noting that city indicators are still estimated on the basis of migrants. However, the value of experience
acquired in cities of different sizes is estimated on the basis of both migrants and stayers. This is because, although
location does not change for stayers, their experience changes from month to month while working. Estimating the
depreciation of experience once a worker moves away from the city where it was acquired does, of course, still rely on
workers accumulating experience in different types of cities. This requirement is easily satisﬁed in the data given that
we track workplace locations since 1981 or entry in social security, although our estimation period is 2004–2009. In our
sample of 150,375 workers, 21,292 workers accumulate some experience both in the top two cities and in smaller cities,
while 15,453 accumulate some experience in cities ranked 3rd to 5th and elsewhere.
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Panel (a) Proﬁles allowing for learning beneﬁts of bigger cities
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Panel (b) Proﬁles not allowing for learning beneﬁts of bigger cities
Figure 3: Earnings proﬁles relative to median-sized city
16to the earnings of a worker in Santiago. There is still a substantial gap in the proﬁle of relative
earnings, although smaller in magnitude than in the case of Madrid: an initial earnings differential
of 2% and of 11% after ten years.
The dashed lines in panel (a) of ﬁgure 3 illustrate the portability of the learning advantages of
bigger cities. The top dashed line shows the estimated relative earnings proﬁle for an individual
who, after ﬁve years of working in Madrid, moves to Santiago. Up until year ﬁve, his relative
earnings proﬁle is the same as that of a worker who always works in Madrid. At that point,
he relocates to Santiago, and his relative earnings drop as a result of the Santiago ﬁxed-effect
replacing the Madrid ﬁxed-effect, and of the value of the experience he acquired over the ﬁve-years
in Madrid changing following his relocation (recall we let the value of experience vary depending
not only on where it was acquired but also on where it is being used). Since, according to the
estimates of column (1) of table 2, the change in the value of experience acquired in Madrid after
moving is quantitatively small, the 10% drop in earnings is explained mostly by the difference in
city ﬁxed-effects. From then onwards, his relative earnings proﬁle appears ﬂat in the plot (meaning
earnings thereafter rise at the same pace as for a worker who has always been in Santiago),
but above the horizontal axis. This vertical gap reﬂects that this migrant earns 13% more than
someone who has always been in Santiago, thanks to the more valuable experience accumulated
in Madrid.18 Someone moving to Santiago after ﬁve years in Sevilla exhibits a similar qualitatively
relative proﬁle, although with smaller magnitudes.
The evolution of earnings portrayed in panel (a) of ﬁgure 3 shows that much of the earnings
premium that bigger cities offer are not instantaneous, but instead accumulate over time and are
highly portable. This perspective contrasts with the usual static view that earlier estimations of
this premium have adopted. This static view is summarized in panel (b) of ﬁgure 3. Once again
we depict the proﬁle of relative earnings for a worker in Madrid or Sevilla relative to a worker
in Santiago, but now on the basis of column (3) of table 1 instead of column (1) of table 2. In
this view, implicit in the standard ﬁxed-effects estimation without city-speciﬁc experience, relative
earnings for a worker in Madrid exhibit only a constant difference with respect to Santiago: a static
premium of 10% gained immediately when starting to work in Madrid and lost immediately upon
departure.19
Our ﬁndings reveal that the premium of working in bigger cities has a sizable dynamic compo-
nent and that workers do not lose this when moving to smaller cities. This latter result strongly
suggests that a learning mechanism is indeed behind the accumulation of the premium.
18We have tried allowing for further gradual depreciation in the value of the experience acquired in a city of a certain
size after a worker has relocated to a bigger or a smaller city, but found that the estimated coefﬁcients for this further
gradual depreciation are not statistically signiﬁcantly different from zero.
19Earlier papers arguing that the urban earnings premium has an important dynamic component include Glaeser and
Maré (2001) and Gould (2007). Glaeser and Maré (2001) compare the earnings premium associated with working in a
metropolitan area instead of a rural area in the United States across migrants with different arrival dates. They ﬁnd
the premium is larger for migrants who, at the time they are observed in the data, have already spent some time in
a metropolitan area than for those who have only recently arrived. Gould (2007) ﬁnds in a structural estimation that
white-collar workers in us rural areas earn more if they have previously worked in a metropolitan area.
17Short-term and medium-term city-size earnings premia
After having addressed the two sources of bias we have emphasized in the ﬁrst stage of the
estimation, we can proceed to estimate the elasticity of the static earnings premium with respect
to city size in the second stage. In column (2) of table 2 we regress the city indicators estimated in
column (1) on log city size and obtain an elasticity of 0.026. This magnitude is essentially identical
to the static ﬁxed-effects estimate in column (4) of table 1. In section 2 we showed that the bias
in the static ﬁxed-effects estimate would tend to be small if the direction of migration ﬂows is
balanced and the learning beneﬁts of bigger cities are portable. Migration ﬂows between cities of
different sizes are indeed balanced in our data, as already noted above. Furthermore, the estimates
of our dynamic speciﬁcation show that experience accumulated in bigger cities remains roughly
just as valuable if workers relocate. This is good news, because it implies that existing ﬁxed-effects
estimates of the static gains from bigger cities are accurate and robust to the existence of important
dynamic effects.
Studying the static earnings premium from currently working in bigger cities alone, however,
ignores that there are also important dynamic gains. To study a longer horizon, we can estimate a
medium-term earnings premium that incorporates both static and dynamic components. For this
purpose, we add to the ﬁxed-effects for each city the estimated value of experience accumulated in
that same city evaluated at the average experience in a single location for workers in our sample
(7.24 years). The estimated elasticity of this medium-term earnings premium with respect to city
size, in column (3) of table 2, is 0.049.
Comparison of the 0.049 elasticity of the medium-term earnings premium with respect to city
size in column (3) of table 2 with the 0.026 elasticity of the short-term static premium in column (2)
indicates that in the medium term, about half of the gains from working in bigger cities are static
and about half are dynamic.
Notealsothatthe0.049elasticityofthemedium-termearningspremiumwithrespecttocitysize
in column (3) of table 2 is almost identical to the static pooled ols estimate in column (2) of table
1. This suggests that the drop in the estimated elasticity between a static pooled ols estimation
and a static ﬁxed-effects estimation is not due to sorting but to dynamic effects. When estimating
the medium-term elasticity in column (3) of table 2, we have brought dynamic effects back in, but
left sorting on unobserved time-invariant ability out. The fact that this takes us back from the
magnitude of the static ﬁxed-effects to the magnitude of the pooled ols estimate indicates that
learning effects can fully account for the difference. This not only underscores the relevance of
the dynamic beneﬁts of bigger cities, it also suggests that sorting may not be very important. We
return to this issue later in the paper.
While our estimate of the medium-term beneﬁt of working in bigger cities resembles a basic
pooled ols estimate, our methodology allows us to separately quantify the static and the dynamic
components and to discuss the portability of the dynamic part. Further, the estimation of the com-
bined medium-term effect is more precise. Figure 4 plots the estimated medium-term premium
against log city size. Compared with the plot for the pooled ols speciﬁcation in ﬁgure 2, log
city size explains a larger share of variation in medium-term earnings across cities (R2 of 0.366 vs.
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Figure 4: Dynamic ﬁxed-effects estimation of the medium-term city-size premium
0.256). In fact, we observe that many small and medium-sized cities now lie closer to the regression
line. One reason why some cities are outliers in the pooled ols estimation is that they have either
relatively many or relatively few workers who have accumulated substantial experience in the
biggest cities. Workers in cities far above the regression line in ﬁgure 2, such as Tarragona-Reus,
Girona, Manresa or Puertollano have accumulated at least 6% of their overall experience in the
ﬁve biggest cities. Workers in cities far below the regression line in ﬁgure 2, such as Santa Cruz de
Tenerife-La Laguna, Ourense, Elda-Petrer, Lugo or Gran Canaria Sur have accumulated less than
2% of their overall experience in the ﬁve biggest cities.
Addressing the endogeneity of city sizes
While we have addressed potential sources of bias in the ﬁrst-stage estimation of column (1) in
table 2, an important potential source of bias remains in the second-stage estimation of columns
(2) and (3). The association between earnings premium and city size is subject to endogeneity
concerns. More precisely, an omitted variable bias could arise if some city characteristic simulta-
neously boosts earnings and attracts workers to the city, thus increasing its size. We may also face
a reverse causality problem if higher earnings similarly lead to an increase in city size.
The extant literature has already addressed this endogeneity concern and found it to be of small
practicalimportance(CicconeandHall,1996,Combesetal.,2010). Relativecitysizesareverystable
over time (Eaton and Eckstein, 1997, Black and Henderson, 2003). If certain cities are large for some
historical reason that is unrelated with the current earnings premium (other than through size
itself), we need not be too concerned about the endogeneity of city sizes. Thus, following Ciccone
19and Hall (1996), we instrument current city size using historical city size data. In particular, our
population instrument counts the number of people within 10 kilometres of the average resident
in a city back in 1900.20 Following Combes, Duranton, Gobillon, and Roux (2010), we also use
land fertility data. The argument for using land fertility as an instrument is that fertility was an
important driver of relative city sizes back when the country was mostly agricultural, and these
relative size differences have persisted, but land fertility is not directly important for production
today (agriculture accounted for 60% of employment in Spain in 1900 compared with 4% in 2009).
In particular, we use as an instrument the percentage of land within 25 kilometres of the city centre
that has high potential quality. Potential land quality refers to the inherent physical quality of the
land resources for agriculture, biomass production and vegetation growth, prior to any modern
intervention such as irrigation.21
In addition to these instruments used in previous studies, we incorporate two additional instru-
ments suggested by the work of Saiz (2010). A city’s ability to grow is limited by the availability
of land suitable for construction. Saiz studies the geographical determinants of land supply in the
United States and shows that land supply is greatly affected by how much land around a city is
covered by water or has slopes greater than 15%. Thus, we also use as instruments the percentage
of land within 25 kilometers of the city centre that is covered by oceans, rivers or lakes and the
percentage that has slopes greater than 15%.22 The ﬁnal instrument we include is motivated by the
work of Goerlich and Mas (2009). They document how small municipalities with high elevation,
of which there are many in Spain, lost population to nearby urban areas over the course of the 20th
century. An urban area’s current size, for a given size in 1900, could thus be affected by having
high-elevation areas nearby. The instrument we use to incorporate this is the log mean elevation
within 25 kilometers of the city centre.
Table 3 gives the ﬁrst and second stages of our instrumental variable estimation. The ﬁrst-stage
results in column (1) show that the instruments are jointly signiﬁcant and strong. The F-statistic (or
robust Kleinberger-Papp rk Wald statistic) for weak identiﬁcation exceeds all thresholds proposed
by Stock and Yogo (2005) for the maximal relative bias and maximal size. The LM test conﬁrms
our instruments are relevant as we reject the null that the model is underidentiﬁed. We can also
rule out potential endogeneity of the instruments: the Hansen-J test cannot reject the null of the
20We obtain historical population data from Goerlich, Mas, Azagra, and Chorén (2006) who construct decennial mu-
nicipality population series using all available censuses from 1900 to 2001, keeping constant the areas of municipalities
in 2001. We replicate our strategy to construct current urban area size, but use instead 1900 municipal population;
however, since we lack the equivalent of LandScan information at that time, we distribute population uniformly within
the municipality.
21The source of theland quality data is the corine Project (Coordination of Informationon the Environment), initiated
by the European Commission in 1985 and later incorporated by the European Environment Agency into its work
programme (European Environment Agency, 1990). We calculate the percentage of land within 25 kilometres of the
city centre with high potential quality using Geographic Information Systems (gis). The city centre is deﬁned as the
centroid of the main municipality of the urban area (the municipality that gives the urban area its name or the most
populated municipality when the urban area does not take its name from a municipality).
22Geographic information on the location of water bodies in and around urban areas is computed using gis and the
digital map of Spain’s hydrography included with Goerlich, Mas, Azagra, and Chorén (2006). Slope is calculated on the
basis of elevation data from the Shuttle Radar Topographic Mission (Jarvis, Reuter, Nelson, and Guevara, 2008), which
records elevation for points on a grid 3 arc-seconds apart (approximately 90 metres).
20Table 3: iv estimation of the dynamic city size earnings premium
(1) (2) (3)
Dependent variable: Log Initial Medium-term
size premium premium
Instrumented log city size 0.023 0.048
(0.008) (0.014)
Log city size 1900 0.702
(0.074)
% high-fertility land within 25km.of city centre 0.016
(0.006)
% water within 25km.of city centre 0.006
(0.002)
% steep terrain within 25km.of city centre -0.014
(0.006)
Log mean elevation within 25km.of city centre 0.292
(0.086)
Observations 73 73 73
R2 0.687 0.164 0.366
F-test weak ident. (H0: instruments jointly insigniﬁcant) 35.698 35.698
P-value LM test (H0: model underidentiﬁed) 0.008 0.008
P-value J test (H0: instruments uncorr. with error term) 0.246 0.139
P-value endog. test (H0: exogeneity of instrumented var.) 0.522 0.680
Notes: All regressions include a constant term. Column (1) is the ﬁrst-stage regression of log city size on a set of
historical population and geographical instruments. Columns (2) and (3) are second-stage regressions of city premia
on instrumented log city size. Coefﬁcients are reported with robust standard errors in parenthesis. , , and 
indicate signiﬁcance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels. The F-statistic (or robust Kleinberger-Papp rk Wald statistic)
reported on the weak instruments identiﬁcation test exceeds all thresholds proposed by Stock and Yogo (2005) for the
maximal relative bias and maximal size.
instruments being uncorrelated with the error. Lastly, according to the endogeneity test, the data
does not reject the use of ols.23
Column (2) of table 3 shows that the elasticity of the initial premium with respect to city size is
not substantially affected by instrumenting (it is 0.023, compared with 0.025 in table 2). Similarly,
column (3) shows that the elasticity of the medium-term premium with respect to city size is also
almostunchangedbyinstrumenting(itis0.048, comparedwith0.049intable2). Infact, aHausman
test fails to reject that instrumental variables are not required to estimate these elasticities. This is
in line with the consensus among urban economists that the endogeneity of city sizes ends up
not being an important issue when estimating the beneﬁts of bigger cities (Combes, Duranton,
Gobillon, and Roux, 2010).
6. The interaction between ability and the learning beneﬁts of bigger cities
Following Baker (1997), a large literature emphasizes that there is substantial heterogeneity in
earnings proﬁles across workers, which has important implications for income dynamics and
23The instruments are also individually signiﬁcant, with the only exception of log mean elevation around the city
(which, given the motivation, only makes sense as an instrument after controlling for historical city size) and the
percentage of water. Regarding water, note that in addition to the negative effect on land supply, it has a positive
effect on land demand through its amenity value. Its overall effect on city size is, thus, ambiguous. The ﬁrst-stage of the
instrumental variable estimation shows a small net positive effect of water bodies around a city.
21choices made over the life-cycle (see Meghir and Pistaferri, 2011, for a review). In the previous
section, we have shown that an important part of the advantages associated with bigger cities
is that they provide steeper earnings proﬁles. Given that both higher individual ability and
experience acquired in bigger cities can increase earnings faster, we now explore whether there
are complementarities between them, i.e. whether more able workers enjoy greater learning
advantages from bigger cities.
A simple approach is to classify workers into different ability groups based on observables,
for instance their educational attainment or occupational skills. When we try this, the estimation
results (not reported) show no signiﬁcant differences in the value of experience acquired in cities
of different sizes across worker types deﬁned by observable indicators of ability. This leads us to
use a broader deﬁnition of ability that includes both observables and unobservables, as captured
by worker ﬁxed-effects.
To incorporate our interaction between ability and the learning beneﬁts of bigger cities into our
framework, suppose the log wage of worker i in city c at time t, wict, is given by
wict = sc + mi +
C
å
j=1
(dj + fjmi)eijt + x0
itb + #ict . (12)
In this speciﬁcation we allow the value of experience accumulated in a city to differ for individuals
with different levels of unobserved ability. More speciﬁcally, relative to equation (1), we allow
the value of experience accumulated in different cities to have not only a common component dj,
but also an additional component fj that interacts with the individual worker effect mi. We can
estimate equation (12) recursively. Given a set of worker ﬁxed-effects (for instance, those coming
from estimating equation (11) which corresponds to fj = 0), we can estimate equation (12) by
ordinary least squares, then obtain a new set of estimates of worker ﬁxed-effects as
ˆ mi =
wict   ˆ sc   å
C
j=1 ˆ djeijt   x0
it ˆ b
1+ å
C
j=1 ˆ fjeijt
, (13)
then, given these new worker ﬁxed-effects estimate again equation (12), and so on until conver-
gence is achieved.24
Table 4 shows the results of our iterative estimation. Relative to column (1) of table 2 we have
added interactions between experience and ability (estimated worker ﬁxed-effects).25 The inter-
actions are statistically signiﬁcant and large in magnitude. To get a better sense of the differences
implied by the coefﬁcients of table 4, ﬁgure 5 uses these to recalculate the earnings proﬁles of
ﬁgure 3 for workers of different ability. We consider two different workers, a high-ability one (in
the 75th percentile of the estimated overall worker ﬁxed-effects distribution) and a low-ability one
(in the 25th percentile of the same distribution). The two solid lines depict the earnings proﬁles
over ten years for a high-ability worker in Madrid and in Sevilla, relative to the earnings of an
individual with identical observable characteristics and the same level of ability who is working in
24In our empirical estimations we include experience and its square. The equations in the text omit the quadratic
terms to simplify the exposition and for consistency with our earlier methodological discussion.
25We exclude interactions between experience acquired in bigger cities and current location given their minor quan-
titative importance.
22Table 4: Estimation of the heterogeneous dynamic and static city-size earnings premia
(1) (2) (3)
Log earnings Initial Medium-term
Dependent variable: net of worker premium premium
ﬁxed-effect (city indicator (initial +
coefﬁcients 7 years local
column (1)) experience)
Log city size 0.025 0.046
(0.006) (0.010)
City indicators Yes
Experience 1st-2nd biggest cities 0.024
(0.001)
(Experience 1st-2nd biggest cities)2 -0.001
(0.000)
Exp. 1st-2nd biggest  worker ﬁxed-effect 0.020
(0.002)
(Exp. 1st-2nd biggest)2 worker ﬁxed-effect -0.000
(0.000)
Experience 3rd-5th biggest cities 0.010
(0.001)
(Experience 3rd-5th biggest cities)2 -0.000
(0.000)
Exp. 3rd-5th biggest  worker ﬁxed-effect 0.014
(0.002)
(Exp. 3rd-5th biggest)2 worker ﬁxed-effect -0.001
(0.000)
Experience 0.100
(0.001)
Experience2 -0.001
(0.000)
Experience  worker ﬁxed-effect 0.059
(0.002)
(Experience)2 worker ﬁxed-effect -0.002
(0.000)
Firm tenure 0.002
(0.000)
Firm tenure2 -0.000
(0.000)
Occupation indicators Yes
Observations 5,821,846 73 73
R2 0.126 0.156 0.334
Notes: All regressions include a constant term. Column (1) also includes month-year indicators, two-digit sector
indicators, and contract-type indicators. Coefﬁcients in column (1) are reported with bootstrapped standard errors
in parenthesis which are clustered by worker (achieving convergence of coefﬁcients and mean squared error of the
estimation in each of the 100 bootstrap iterations). Coefﬁcients in columns (2) and (3) are reported with robust standard
errors in parenthesis. , , and  indicate signiﬁcance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels. The R2 reported in column
(1) is within workers. Worker values of experience and tenure are calculated on the basis of actual days worked and
expressed in years. City medium-term premium calculated for workers’ average experience in one city (7.24 years).
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Figure 5: Earnings proﬁle relative to median-sized city, high- and low-ability worker
the median-sized city, Santiago de Compostela. After ten years, the earnings gap between working
in Madrid and Santiago is 37% for the high-ability worker and 27% for the low ability worker. The
differences between working in Sevilla and Santiago are smaller but still sizeable: 13% for the
high-ability worker and 8% for the low-ability worker.
These results reveal that there is a large role for heterogeneity in the dynamic beneﬁts of city
size. Experience is more valuable when acquired in bigger cities and this differential value of
experience is substantially larger for workers with higher innate ability.
7. Sorting
Our estimations simultaneously consider static advantages associated with workers’ current loca-
tion, learning by working in bigger cities and spatial sorting. However, we have so far left sorting
mostly in the background. We now bring sorting to the fore, by comparing the distribution of
worker ability across cities of different sizes.
Several other papers compare workers’ ability and skills across cities. Some focus on education
(e.g., Berry and Glaeser, 2005) while others look at broader measures of skills (e.g., Bacolod, Blum,
and Strange, 2009). We study worker ﬁxed-effects because we are interested in distinguishing
whether workers who are inherently more able choose to locate in bigger cities or whether it is
working in bigger cities that makes workers more skilled. Worker ﬁxed-effects allow us to capture
time-invariant ability. However, for this to work it is important to estimate worker ﬁxed-effects on
the basis of our full earnings speciﬁcation.
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Figure 6: Comparisons of worker ﬁxed-effects distributions across cities
We have seen that a static ﬁxed-effects estimation such as that of column (3) in table 1 gives
roughly correct estimates of city ﬁxed-effects. Nevertheless, it yields biased estimates of worker
ﬁxed-effects that incorporate not only time-invariant unobserved worker characteristics that affect
earnings, butalsothetime-varyingeffectofexperienceinbiggercitiesanditsinteractionwithtime-
invariant skills. In particular, estimation of m on the basis of equation (6) if wages are determined
as in equation (12) results in a biased estimate of m:
plim ˆ mife = mi(1+ fj¯ eijt) +
C
å
j=1
dj¯ eijt . (14)
If we do not take this bias into account, it could appear from the estimated ﬁxed-effects that
workers in bigger cities have higher ability on average even if the distribution of m in small and
big cities were identical. Estimation based on equation (12) yields instead plim ˆ mi = mi.
Panel (a) in ﬁgure 6 plots the distribution of worker ﬁxed-effects in the ﬁve biggest cities (solid
line) and in cities below the top ﬁve (dashed line) based on our full earnings speciﬁcation with
25heterogeneous dynamic and static beneﬁts of bigger cities (Table 4, column 1).26 We can see
that both distributions look alike (we do a formal comparison below). This suggests that there
is little sorting: the distribution of workers’ innate ability (as measured by their ﬁxed-effects) is
very similar in small and big cities.
Panel (b) repeats the plot, but now constrains the dynamic beneﬁts of bigger cities to be ho-
mogenous across workers (worker ﬁxed-effects in this panel come from table 2, column 1). While
both distributions have almost the same mean, the distribution in bigger cities exhibits a higher
variance. This is the result of forcing experience acquired in bigger cities to be equally valuable
for everyone, so the ability of workers at the top of the distribution appears larger than it is (this
estimation mixes the extra value that big-city experience has for them with their innate ability),
while the ability of workers at the bottom of the distribution appears smaller than it is. Hence,
by ignoring the heterogeneity of the dynamic beneﬁts of bigger cities we can get the erroneous
impression that there is greater dispersion of innate ability in bigger cities.
Panel (c) leaves out any dynamic beneﬁts of bigger cities and plots worker ﬁxed-effects from a
purely static speciﬁcation. This corresponds to the same comparison of ﬁxed-effects carried out by
Combes, Duranton, Gobillon, and Roux (2012b). They ﬁnd a higher mean and greater dispersion
of worker ﬁxed-effects in bigger cities for France, which is also what this panel shows for Spain.
This higher mean and variance is ampliﬁed in the distribution of log earnings, plotted in panel
(d). Combes, Duranton, Gobillon, and Roux (2012b) carefully acknowledge that their estimated
ﬁxed-effects capture ‘average skills’ over a worker’s lifetime. In contrast, panel (a) separates
innate ability from the cumulative effect of the experience acquired in different cities, showing
that differences arise as a result of the greater value of experience acquired in bigger cities, which
is ampliﬁed for more able workers.
Table 5 performs a formal comparison of the plotted distributions, using the methodology
developed by Combes, Duranton, Gobillon, Puga, and Roux (2012a) to approximate two distri-
butions. In particular we approximate the distribution of worker ﬁxed-effects in the ﬁve biggest
cities, FB(mi), bytakingthedistributionofworkerﬁxed-effectsinsmallercities, FS(mi), shiftingitby
an amount A, and dilating it by a factor D. ˆ A and ˆ D are estimated to minimize the mean quantile
difference between the actual big-city distribution FB(mi) and the shifted and dilated small-city
distribution FS ((mi   A)/D).27
The top row compares the distributions of worker ﬁxed-effects from our full speciﬁcation with
heterogeneous dynamic and static beneﬁts of bigger cities (Table 4, column 1). The second row
forces these beneﬁts to be homogenous across workers. The third row constrains the beneﬁts of
bigger cities to be purely static. The bottom row compares log earnings. The table conﬁrms what
was visually apparent from ﬁgure 6.
Starting from the bottom row, earnings are higher on average in bigger cities. The shift parame-
teris ˆ A = 0.216, indicatingthataverageearningsare24%(e0.216 1)higherintheﬁvebiggestcities.
26Each individual is assigned to the city where he was working in May 2007.
27Combes, Duranton, Gobillon, Puga, and Roux (2012a) also allow for truncation of one distribution to approximate
theother. Weﬁndnosigniﬁcanttruncationwhencomparingourtwodistributions, andsointable5werestrictourselves
to shift and dilation.
26Table 5: Comparison of earnings and worker ﬁxed-effects distributions, 5 biggest vs. other cities
Worker ﬁxed-effects estimation Shift Dilation Mean square R2 Obs.
( ˆ A) ( ˆ D) quantile diff.
Worker ﬁxed-effects, heterogeneous dynamic 0.011 1.040 6.6e-04 0.919 84,662
and static premium (Table 4, column (1)) (0.003)  (0.007) 
Worker ﬁxed-effects, homogenous dynamic -0.004 1.147 7.0e-03 0.994 84,662
and static premium (Table 2, column (1)) (0.006) (0.008) 
Worker ﬁxed-effects, static premium 0.150 1.106 4.9e-02 0.981 84,662
(Combes et al., 2012) (0.006)  (0.005) 
Log earnings 0.216 1.211 .11 0.982 84,662
(0.003)  (0.008) 
Notes: The table applies the methodology of Combes, Duranton, Gobillon, Puga, and Roux (2012a) to approximate the
distribution of worker ﬁxed-effects in the ﬁve biggest cities, FB(mi), by taking the distribution of worker ﬁxed-effects
in smaller cities, FS(mi), shifting it by an amount A, and dilating it by a factor D. ˆ A and ˆ D are estimated to
minimize the mean quantile difference between the actual big-city distribution FB(mi) and the shifted and dilated
small-city distribution FS ((mi   A)/D). M(0,1) is the total mean quantile difference between FB(mi) and FS(mi).
R2 = 1  M( ˆ A, ˆ D)/M(0,1) is the fraction of this difference that can be explained by shifting and dilating FS(mi).
Coefﬁcients are reported with bootstrapped standard errors in parenthesis (re-estimating worker ﬁxed-effects in each
of the 100 bootstrap iterations). , , and  indicate signiﬁcance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels.
Earnings are also more dispersed in bigger cities. The dilation parameter is ˆ D = 1.211 indicating
that the distribution of earnings in the ﬁve biggest cities is ampliﬁed by that factor relative to the
distribution in smaller cities.
Moving one row up, the distribution of worker ﬁxed-effects from a static speciﬁcation also
exhibits a higher mean and greater dispersion in bigger cities. However, both the estimated shift
and dilation parameters are smaller than those for earnings, and the distributions are more similar
(the mean squared quantile difference is one order of magnitude smaller, 4.9e   02 instead of .11).
This implies that observables, such as employment in different sectors, account for a signiﬁcant
fraction of the differences.
The next row up introduces dynamic effects. This brings the distributions even closer (the
mean squared quantile difference is reduced by another order of magnitude). The estimated shift
parameter is not statistically signiﬁcantly different from zero, indicating both distributions are
centred on the same mean. However, the distribution of worker ﬁxed-effects is still more dispersed
in the ﬁve biggest cities ( ˆ D = 1.147).
The top row corresponds to our full speciﬁcation. Once we allow experience in bigger cities to
be more valuable and workers with higher innate ability to take greater advantage of this, worker
ﬁxed-effects exhibit extremely similar distributions in big and small cities (the mean squared
quantile difference is reduced by yet another order of magnitude). The estimated shift and dilation
parameters, while statistically signiﬁcant, are very close to 0 and to 1, respectively.
Several recent studies (Eeckhout, Pinheiro, and Schmidheiny, 2010, Combes, Duranton, Go-
billon, and Roux, 2012b, Baum-Snow and Pavan, 2012b) emphasize that earnings are higher on
average and also exhibit greater dispersion in bigger cities. Our results in this section indicate that
this is not the result of sorting. In fact, differences in the distribution of innate ability are quite
similar in big and small cities. Instead, workers in bigger cities attain higher earnings on average
27precisely thanks to working there, which provides them with static advantages and also allows
them to accumulate more valuable experience. Because more able workers beneﬁt the most and
lessableworkersbeneﬁttheleastfromworkinginbiggercities, asimilardistributionofunderlying
ability translates into greater dispersion of earnings in bigger cities. In sum, workers in big and
small cities are not particularly different to start with, it is working in cities of different sizes that
makes their earnings diverge.
8. Conclusions
We have examined three reasons why ﬁrms may be willing to pay more to workers in bigger cities.
First, there may be some static advantages associated with bigger cities. Second, bigger cities
may allow workers to accumulate more valuable experience. Third, workers who are inherently
more productive may choose to locate in bigger cities. Using a large and rich panel data set for
workers in Spain, we provide a quantitative assessment of the importance of each of these three
mechanisms in generating earnings differentials across cities of different sizes.
We ﬁnd that there are substantial static and dynamic advantages from working in bigger cities.
The medium-term elasticity of earnings (after seven years) with respect to city size is close to 0.05.
About one-half of these gains are static and tied to currently working in a bigger city. About
another half accrues over time as workers accumulate more valuable experience in bigger cities.
Furthermore, workers are able to take these dynamic gains with them when they relocate, which
we interpret as evidence that learning in bigger cities is important. Sorting of initially more able
workers into bigger cities plays at best a minor role in explaining earnings differentials.
In the process of deriving our results, we also make some methodological progress. We conﬁrm
that estimations of the static city-size premium that use worker ﬁxed-effects to address sorting,
but ignore the learning advantages of bigger cities, provide an accurate estimate of the purely
static gains. However, besides not capturing learning, they overestimate the importance of sorting
because they mix innate ability with the extra value of big-city experience. Once we disentangle
ability and the value of accumulated experience, cities of different sizes have quite similar distri-
butions of worker ability.
Overall, we conclude that workers in bigger cities are not particularly different in terms of
innate ability. It is working in cities of different sizes that makes their earnings diverge. The
combination of static gains and learning advantages together with the fact that higher-ability
workers beneﬁt more from bigger cities explain why the distribution of earnings in bigger cities
has higher mean and higher variance.
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